zhengchiliu
b94dd6dffb
- 订单状态新增「6 申请退款中」，用户申请退款原子流转并落待审核退款流水 - 退款失败回退订单至已支付并恢复被取消的权益发放任务 - 新增虚拟支付退款查单兜底任务，反查超时订单并自动订正 - 会员包来源额度不叠加，扣减/回退/回收口径统一为只取生效一份 - 退款回收流水按吊销前后有效剩余差值记账，避免无效回收记录 - 同步更新 README 与 Stitch 设计文档
635 lines
30 KiB
Go
635 lines
30 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"log/slog"
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"strconv"
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"time"
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"unicode/utf8"
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"git.lzcwy.cn/zhengchiliu/zt-closet-backend/global"
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"git.lzcwy.cn/zhengchiliu/zt-closet-backend/internal/dto"
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"git.lzcwy.cn/zhengchiliu/zt-closet-backend/internal/mysqldao"
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"git.lzcwy.cn/zhengchiliu/zt-closet-backend/internal/mysqlmodel"
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"git.lzcwy.cn/zhengchiliu/zt-closet-backend/internal/redisdao"
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"git.lzcwy.cn/zhengchiliu/zt-closet-backend/internal/redismodel"
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"git.lzcwy.cn/zhengchiliu/zt-closet-backend/pkg/errcode"
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"git.lzcwy.cn/zhengchiliu/zt-closet-backend/pkg/wechat"
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"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
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)
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// VirtualOrderCreate 创建虚拟支付订单：本地落单（pay_channel=2）并返回前端调起
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// wx.requestVirtualPayment 所需的 signData / paySig / signature。
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func (s *OrderService) VirtualOrderCreate(ctx context.Context, userID int64, request *dto.VirtualOrderCreateRequest) (*dto.VirtualOrderCreateResponse, *errcode.Error) {
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ctx, span := global.Tracer.Start(ctx, "svc.VirtualOrderCreate")
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defer span.End()
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if !wechat.IsVirtualPayEnabled() {
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slog.WarnContext(ctx, "virtual order create: virtual pay not enabled", "user_id", userID)
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return nil, errcode.VirtualPayNotEnabled
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}
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// 订单记录当前激活的虚拟支付环境（现网 0 / 沙箱 1），发货推送按此校验。
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xpayEnv, verr := wechat.GetVirtualPayEnv()
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if verr != nil {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "virtual order create: resolve pay env failed", "user_id", userID, "error", verr)
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return nil, errcode.VirtualPayNotEnabled
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}
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goods, err := s.goodsDao.GoodsGetByCode(ctx, request.GoodsCode)
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if err != nil {
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if isNotFound(err) {
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slog.InfoContext(ctx, "virtual order create: goods not found", "user_id", userID, "goods_code", request.GoodsCode)
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return nil, errcode.GoodsNotFound
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}
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "virtual order create: query goods failed", "goods_code", request.GoodsCode, "error", err)
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return nil, errcode.DatabaseError
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}
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if goods.Status != GoodsStatusOnShelf {
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slog.InfoContext(ctx, "virtual order create: goods off shelf", "user_id", userID, "goods_code", request.GoodsCode)
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return nil, errcode.GoodsOffShelf
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}
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if goods.ProductID == "" || goods.ProductStatus != GoodsProductPublished {
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slog.WarnContext(ctx, "virtual order create: goods not published as xpay product",
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"user_id", userID, "goods_code", request.GoodsCode, "product_id", goods.ProductID, "product_status", goods.ProductStatus)
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return nil, errcode.VirtualPayGoodsNotPublished
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}
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// iOS 端微信限制最低支付 1 元（100 分），低于此金额调起支付必失败，提前拒绝以降低垃圾订单。
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// 注意：platform 由前端上报（不可作为安全边界，可伪造为 android 绕过此限制）；
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// 此校验仅作体验优化，不构成资损防线——真正的资损防线是发货推送 verifyXPayOrderPaid
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// 对微信侧订单真实性、金额、道具的反查。低金额商品在 iOS 上的垃圾订单靠过期清理兜底。
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if request.Platform == XPayPlatformIOS && goods.DiscountPrice < 100 {
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slog.InfoContext(ctx, "virtual order create: rejected low amount on ios",
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"user_id", userID, "goods_code", request.GoodsCode, "pay_amount", goods.DiscountPrice)
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return nil, errcode.VirtualPayAmountTooLow
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}
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// 虚拟支付 signature 依赖用户 session_key（登录时缓存），缺失说明需重新登录。
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sessionKey, serr := redisdao.AuthSessionKeyGet(ctx, userID)
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if serr != nil {
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if serr == redis.Nil {
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slog.WarnContext(ctx, "virtual order create: session key missing", "user_id", userID)
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return nil, errcode.UnauthorizedTokenError.WithDetails("缺少 session_key，请重新登录")
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}
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "virtual order create: get session key failed", "user_id", userID, "error", serr)
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return nil, errcode.CacheError
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}
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orderNo := genOrderNo()
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expireTime := nowUnix() + orderPayTTLSeconds
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payAmount := goods.DiscountPrice
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platform := request.Platform
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order := &mysqlmodel.Order{
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OrderNo: orderNo,
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UserID: userID,
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GoodsID: goods.ID,
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GoodsName: goods.GoodsName,
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UnitPrice: goods.DiscountPrice,
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TotalAmount: payAmount,
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PayAmount: payAmount,
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PayChannel: PayChannelVirtual,
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OrderStatus: OrderStatusPending,
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MemberDays: goods.MemberDays,
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GoodsType: goods.GoodsType,
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QuotaValidDays: goods.ValidDays,
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CosQuota: goods.CosQuota,
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AIRecommendQuota: goods.AIRecommendQuota,
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ClosetShareQuota: goods.ClosetShareQuota,
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OutfitShareQuota: goods.OutfitShareQuota,
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ExpireTime: expireTime,
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XPayProductID: goods.ProductID,
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XPayPlatform: platform,
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XPayEnv: int8(xpayEnv),
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}
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if cerr := s.orderDao.OrderCreate(ctx, order); cerr != nil {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "virtual order create: save order failed",
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"order_no", orderNo, "user_id", userID, "goods_code", request.GoodsCode, "error", cerr)
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return nil, errcode.VirtualOrderCreateFailed
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}
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sign, perr := wechat.BuildPaymentSign(
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global.VirtualPaySetting.OfferID,
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goods.ProductID,
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orderNo,
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"",
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sessionKey,
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payAmount,
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)
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if perr != nil {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "virtual order create: build payment sign failed", "order_no", orderNo, "user_id", userID, "error", perr)
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return nil, errcode.VirtualOrderCreateFailed
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}
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slog.InfoContext(ctx, "virtual order created",
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"order_no", orderNo, "user_id", userID, "goods_code", request.GoodsCode, "pay_amount", payAmount, "env", xpayEnv)
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return &dto.VirtualOrderCreateResponse{
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OrderNo: orderNo,
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PayAmount: payAmount,
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ExpireTime: expireTime,
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SignData: sign.SignData,
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PaySig: sign.PaySig,
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Signature: sign.Signature,
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}, nil
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}
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// ---- 消息推送回调 ----
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// XPayNotify 处理虚拟支付消息推送（发货/退款/iOS 退款问询/其它），返回应答报文。
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func (s *OrderService) XPayNotify(ctx context.Context, raw []byte) []byte {
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ctx, span := global.Tracer.Start(ctx, "svc.XPayNotify")
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defer span.End()
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base, err := wechat.ParseNotify(raw)
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if err != nil {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay notify parse failed", "error", err)
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return wechat.BuildNotifyResponse(false)
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}
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switch base.Event {
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case wechat.EventGoodsDeliverNotify:
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var deliver wechat.XPayGoodsDeliverNotify
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &deliver); err != nil {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver notify decode failed", "error", err)
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return wechat.BuildNotifyResponse(false)
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}
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if e := s.handleGoodsDeliver(ctx, &deliver, string(raw)); e != nil {
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// 内部失败分支已各自记录 Error 日志，这里仅保留调用链痕迹，避免重复告警。
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slog.DebugContext(ctx, "xpay deliver notify handle failed", "error", e)
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return wechat.BuildNotifyResponse(false)
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}
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return wechat.BuildNotifyResponse(true)
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case wechat.EventRefundNotify:
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var refund wechat.XPayRefundNotify
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &refund); err != nil {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund notify decode failed", "error", err)
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return wechat.BuildNotifyResponse(false)
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}
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if e := s.handleRefundNotify(ctx, &refund, string(raw)); e != nil {
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// 内部失败分支已各自记录 Error 日志，这里仅保留调用链痕迹，避免重复告警。
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slog.DebugContext(ctx, "xpay refund notify handle failed", "error", e)
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return wechat.BuildNotifyResponse(false)
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}
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return wechat.BuildNotifyResponse(true)
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case wechat.EventIOSRefundQueryNotify:
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var query wechat.XPayIOSRefundQueryNotify
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &query); err != nil {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay ios refund query decode failed", "error", err)
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return wechat.BuildNotifyResponse(false)
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}
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return s.handleIOSRefundQuery(ctx, &query)
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default:
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// 投诉/代币/风控等推送：结构化记录即可，暂不实现业务。
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slog.WarnContext(ctx, "xpay notify ignored", "event", base.Event, "out_trade_no", base.OutTradeNo)
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return wechat.BuildNotifyResponse(true)
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}
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}
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// verifyXPayOrderPaid 反查微信侧订单真实性：消息推送无签名，发货前必须通过
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// query_order（带 HMAC 签名的服务端 API）确认订单已真实支付、实付金额一致，
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// 防止伪造发货推送零成本获取权益。任一校验不通过返回错误（fail-closed，触发微信重试）。
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func (s *OrderService) verifyXPayOrderPaid(ctx context.Context, order *mysqlmodel.Order, deliver *wechat.XPayGoodsDeliverNotify) *errcode.Error {
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if deliver.OpenID == "" {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: empty openid", "order_no", order.OrderNo)
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return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
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}
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info, err := wechat.QueryOrder(ctx, deliver.OpenID, deliver.OutTradeNo, "")
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if err != nil {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: query order failed",
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"order_no", order.OrderNo, "error", err)
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return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
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}
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// 微信侧无支付记录/未支付：伪造推送或数据异常，拒绝发放。
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if !wechat.IsOrderPaidStatus(info.Order.Status) {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: order not paid in wechat side",
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"order_no", order.OrderNo, "query_status", info.Order.Status)
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return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
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}
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// 反查金额必须与下单快照一致（资损防线）。
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if info.Order.PaidFee != order.PayAmount {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: query amount mismatch",
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"order_no", order.OrderNo, "query_amount", info.Order.PaidFee, "order_amount", order.PayAmount)
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return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
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}
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// 道具一致性由推送报文层校验（deliver.GoodsInfo.ProductID 对订单快照）；
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// query_order 不回传 product_id，无法在此二次核对，故不再重复校验。
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return nil
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}
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// verifyXPayRefund 反查微信侧退款真实性：退款推送无签名，回退权益前必须通过
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// query_order（带 HMAC 签名的服务端 API）确认订单在微信侧已真实退款、金额一致，
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// 防止伪造退款推送回收权益。任一校验不通过返回错误（fail-closed，触发微信重试）。
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func (s *OrderService) verifyXPayRefund(ctx context.Context, order *mysqlmodel.Order, refund *wechat.XPayRefundNotify) *errcode.Error {
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// query_order 必需 openid：推送未携带时回退用订单归属用户的 openid（订单表不冗余该字段，按 user_id 取）。
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openid := refund.OpenID
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if openid == "" {
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user, uerr := s.userDao.UserGetByID(ctx, order.UserID)
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if uerr != nil {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: get user for openid failed",
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"order_no", order.OrderNo, "user_id", order.UserID, "error", uerr)
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return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
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}
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openid = user.WxOpenID
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}
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if openid == "" {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: empty openid", "order_no", order.OrderNo, "user_id", order.UserID)
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return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
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}
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// 按订单号反查（而非推送中的订单号字段），保证查询目标与本地订单严格一致。
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info, err := wechat.QueryOrder(ctx, openid, order.OrderNo, "")
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if err != nil {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: query order failed",
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"order_no", order.OrderNo, "error", err)
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return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
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}
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// 微信侧无退款记录/未退款：伪造推送或数据异常，拒绝回退权益。
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if !wechat.IsOrderRefundedStatus(info.Order.Status) {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: order not refunded in wechat side",
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"order_no", order.OrderNo, "query_status", info.Order.Status)
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return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
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}
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// 反查退款金额必须与推送一致（资损防线）。
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// 退款单用 refund_fee；支付单退款后用 paid_fee - left_fee 推算累计已退金额。
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refundedFee := info.Order.RefundFee
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if refundedFee <= 0 {
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refundedFee = info.Order.PaidFee - info.Order.LeftFee
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}
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if refundedFee != refund.RefundFee {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: refund amount mismatch",
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"order_no", order.OrderNo, "query_refunded_fee", refundedFee, "notify_refund_fee", refund.RefundFee)
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return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
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}
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return nil
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}
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// handleGoodsDeliver 处理道具发货推送：幂等锁 + 金额/道具校验 + 条件流转 + 发放权益。
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func (s *OrderService) handleGoodsDeliver(ctx context.Context, deliver *wechat.XPayGoodsDeliverNotify, raw string) *errcode.Error {
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lockKey := fmtLockKey(redismodel.KeyLockPayCallback, deliver.OutTradeNo)
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lockVal := genUUID()
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ok, lerr := redisdao.TryLock(ctx, lockKey, lockVal, 30*time.Second)
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if lerr != nil {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: acquire lock failed", "out_trade_no", deliver.OutTradeNo, "error", lerr)
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return nil // 锁不可用（Redis 故障）：不重复处理，交由微信重试/持锁者。
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}
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if !ok {
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slog.DebugContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: concurrent callback, skip", "out_trade_no", deliver.OutTradeNo)
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return nil // 并发回调，交由持锁者处理。
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}
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defer func() { _ = redisdao.Unlock(ctx, lockKey, lockVal) }()
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order, gerr := s.orderDao.OrderGetByOrderNo(ctx, deliver.OutTradeNo)
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if gerr != nil {
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if isNotFound(gerr) {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: order not found", "out_trade_no", deliver.OutTradeNo)
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return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
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}
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: query order failed", "out_trade_no", deliver.OutTradeNo, "error", gerr)
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return errcode.DatabaseError
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}
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// 仅虚拟支付订单走此链路，防止与普通支付回调串单。
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if order.PayChannel != PayChannelVirtual {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: order not virtual pay", "order_no", order.OrderNo, "pay_channel", order.PayChannel)
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return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
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}
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// 防篡改：道具 ID 与实付金额必须与下单快照一致。
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if deliver.GoodsInfo.ProductID != order.XPayProductID {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: product mismatch",
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"order_no", order.OrderNo, "notify_product", deliver.GoodsInfo.ProductID, "order_product", order.XPayProductID)
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return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
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}
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if deliver.GoodsInfo.ActualPrice != order.PayAmount {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: amount mismatch",
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"order_no", order.OrderNo, "notify_amount", deliver.GoodsInfo.ActualPrice, "order_amount", order.PayAmount)
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return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
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}
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// 防环境串单：沙箱推送不得发放现网订单。
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if int8(deliver.Env) != order.XPayEnv {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: env mismatch",
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"order_no", order.OrderNo, "notify_env", deliver.Env, "order_env", order.XPayEnv)
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return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
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}
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// 订单真实性反查：消息推送无签名，必须反查微信侧订单确认真实支付，
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// 防止伪造发货推送零成本获取权益；未通过返回错误 -> 应答 ErrCode:1，微信重试。
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if verr := s.verifyXPayOrderPaid(ctx, order, deliver); verr != nil {
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return verr
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}
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// 条件流转：待支付 -> 已支付，防重复回调。
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updated, uerr := s.orderDao.OrderUpdateStatusByOrderNo(ctx, deliver.OutTradeNo, OrderStatusPending, OrderStatusPaid)
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if uerr != nil {
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: update order status failed", "out_trade_no", deliver.OutTradeNo, "error", uerr)
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return errcode.DatabaseError
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}
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if updated {
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slog.InfoContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: order paid",
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"order_no", order.OrderNo, "user_id", order.UserID, "pay_amount", order.PayAmount)
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s.finalizeVirtualPaidOrder(ctx, order, deliver.WeChatPayInfo.PaidTime, deliver.WeChatPayInfo.TransactionID, raw)
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return nil
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}
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// 流转失败：处理「订单已过期但用户实际已付款」的竞态（与普通支付 PayNotify 一致）。
|
|
current, gerr := s.orderDao.OrderGetByOrderNo(ctx, deliver.OutTradeNo)
|
|
if gerr != nil {
|
|
if isNotFound(gerr) {
|
|
slog.WarnContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: order disappeared after status conflict", "out_trade_no", deliver.OutTradeNo)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: reload order failed", "out_trade_no", deliver.OutTradeNo, "error", gerr)
|
|
return errcode.DatabaseError
|
|
}
|
|
switch current.OrderStatus {
|
|
case OrderStatusPaid:
|
|
// 已被并发回调处理，兜底补发（幂等）。
|
|
if uerr := s.orderDao.OrderUpdateByOrderNo(ctx, current.OrderNo, map[string]any{
|
|
"pay_time": resolvePaidTime(deliver.WeChatPayInfo.PaidTime),
|
|
"transaction_id": deliver.WeChatPayInfo.TransactionID,
|
|
"callback_raw": raw,
|
|
}); uerr != nil {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: reconcile paid order pay info failed", "order_no", current.OrderNo, "error", uerr)
|
|
}
|
|
slog.InfoContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: order already paid, reconcile benefits", "order_no", current.OrderNo, "user_id", current.UserID)
|
|
s.grantOrderBenefits(ctx, current)
|
|
case OrderStatusExpired:
|
|
// 订单被系统过期但用户已付款：过期 -> 已支付并补发货。
|
|
if ok, uerr := s.orderDao.OrderUpdateStatusByOrderNo(ctx, deliver.OutTradeNo, OrderStatusExpired, OrderStatusPaid); uerr != nil {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: compensate expired order failed", "out_trade_no", deliver.OutTradeNo, "error", uerr)
|
|
return errcode.DatabaseError
|
|
} else if ok {
|
|
slog.InfoContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: expired order compensated", "order_no", current.OrderNo, "user_id", current.UserID)
|
|
s.finalizeVirtualPaidOrder(ctx, current, deliver.WeChatPayInfo.PaidTime, deliver.WeChatPayInfo.TransactionID, raw)
|
|
} else {
|
|
slog.DebugContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: expired order already handled by another callback", "out_trade_no", deliver.OutTradeNo)
|
|
}
|
|
case OrderStatusCancelled:
|
|
// 防御分支：历史上已取消的虚拟支付订单用户仍完成了支付，补发货避免「钱已扣、权益不到账」。
|
|
// 当前虚拟支付订单已禁止取消，此分支兜底存量数据与并发竞态。
|
|
if ok, uerr := s.orderDao.OrderUpdateStatusByOrderNo(ctx, deliver.OutTradeNo, OrderStatusCancelled, OrderStatusPaid); uerr != nil {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: compensate cancelled order failed", "out_trade_no", deliver.OutTradeNo, "error", uerr)
|
|
return errcode.DatabaseError
|
|
} else if ok {
|
|
slog.InfoContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: cancelled order compensated", "order_no", current.OrderNo, "user_id", current.UserID)
|
|
s.finalizeVirtualPaidOrder(ctx, current, deliver.WeChatPayInfo.PaidTime, deliver.WeChatPayInfo.TransactionID, raw)
|
|
} else {
|
|
slog.DebugContext(ctx, "xpay deliver: cancelled order already handled by another callback", "out_trade_no", deliver.OutTradeNo)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleRefundNotify 处理退款推送（xpay_refund_notify）：按官方字段驱动状态流转。
|
|
//
|
|
// 官方报文用 MchOrderId 定位订单、RetCode 判定结果（0=成功，非 0=失败，原因见 RetMsg）。
|
|
// 拿不到订单号或结果不可判定时一律应答失败（ErrCode:1），由微信按 2/4/8/16… 最多重试 15 次，
|
|
// 避免「静默成功」导致订单永久卡在「申请退款中」；成功路径仍强制反查 query_order 确认真实退款
|
|
// （推送无签名），防止伪造推送回收权益。
|
|
func (s *OrderService) handleRefundNotify(ctx context.Context, refund *wechat.XPayRefundNotify, raw string) *errcode.Error {
|
|
orderNo := refund.OrderNo()
|
|
if orderNo == "" {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: empty order no in notify",
|
|
"mch_order_id", refund.MchOrderID, "out_trade_no", refund.OutTradeNo,
|
|
"mch_refund_id", refund.MchRefundID, "wx_refund_id", refund.WxRefundID,
|
|
"retry_times", refund.RetryTimes)
|
|
return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed // 应答失败 -> 微信重试。
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
lockKey := fmtLockKey(redismodel.KeyLockRefundCallback, orderNo)
|
|
lockVal := genUUID()
|
|
ok, lerr := redisdao.TryLock(ctx, lockKey, lockVal, 30*time.Second)
|
|
if lerr != nil {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: acquire lock failed", "order_no", orderNo, "error", lerr)
|
|
return nil // 锁不可用（Redis 故障）：不重复处理，交由微信重试/持锁者。
|
|
}
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
slog.DebugContext(ctx, "xpay refund: concurrent callback, skip", "order_no", orderNo)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
defer func() { _ = redisdao.Unlock(ctx, lockKey, lockVal) }()
|
|
|
|
succ, determinable := refund.Succeeded()
|
|
if !determinable {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: refund result not determinable, ask wechat to retry",
|
|
"order_no", orderNo, "mch_refund_id", refund.MchRefundID, "wx_refund_id", refund.WxRefundID,
|
|
"retry_times", refund.RetryTimes)
|
|
return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
order, gerr := s.orderDao.OrderGetByOrderNo(ctx, orderNo)
|
|
if gerr != nil {
|
|
if isNotFound(gerr) {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: order not found", "order_no", orderNo)
|
|
return errcode.OrderRealityCheckFailed
|
|
}
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: query order failed", "order_no", orderNo, "error", gerr)
|
|
return errcode.DatabaseError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !succ {
|
|
// 退款失败：订单条件回退「6 申请退款中 -> 2 已支付」，允许用户重新申请；
|
|
// 本地流水置失败并记录微信失败原因（无本地流水如 iOS 走 App Store 退款时跳过）。
|
|
reverted, rerr := s.orderDao.OrderUpdateStatusByOrderNo(ctx, order.OrderNo, OrderStatusRefunding, OrderStatusPaid)
|
|
if rerr != nil {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: revert order status failed",
|
|
"order_no", order.OrderNo, "mch_refund_id", refund.MchRefundID, "error", rerr)
|
|
}
|
|
s.markRefundFlowFailed(ctx, order, refund, raw)
|
|
slog.WarnContext(ctx, "xpay refund failed, order reverted to paid",
|
|
"order_no", order.OrderNo, "mch_refund_id", refund.MchRefundID, "ret_code", refundRetCodeText(refund),
|
|
"ret_msg", refund.RetMsg, "refund_fee", refund.RefundFee, "order_reverted", reverted)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 已终态则幂等返回；同时补一次流水回写，覆盖此前「订单已置 5 但流水未同步」的中途失败。
|
|
if order.OrderStatus == OrderStatusRefunded {
|
|
s.markRefundFlowSuccess(ctx, order, refund.WxRefundID, raw)
|
|
slog.DebugContext(ctx, "xpay refund: order already refunded, skip", "order_no", order.OrderNo)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 订单真实性反查：退款推送无签名，回退权益前必须反查微信侧确认真实退款，
|
|
// 防止伪造退款推送回收权益；未通过返回错误 -> 应答 ErrCode:1，微信重试。
|
|
if verr := s.verifyXPayRefund(ctx, order, refund); verr != nil {
|
|
return verr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// settleRefundSuccess 内部含条件流转（Paid/Refunding -> Refunded），重复推送不会重复回退。
|
|
// 内部失败已由 settleRefundSuccess 的使用方日志覆盖：此处接收返回值并记录，避免静默。
|
|
if serr := s.settleRefundSuccess(ctx, order, refund.RefundFee); serr != nil {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: settle refund success failed",
|
|
"order_no", order.OrderNo, "mch_refund_id", refund.MchRefundID, "error", serr)
|
|
}
|
|
// 订单已置 5：同步本地申请流水为成功，并回写微信退款单号与推送原始报文便于对账。
|
|
s.markRefundFlowSuccess(ctx, order, refund.WxRefundID, raw)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// refundRetCodeText 退款结果文本（日志与失败原因用）：优先 RetCode，旧版式回退 RefundStatus。
|
|
func refundRetCodeText(refund *wechat.XPayRefundNotify) string {
|
|
if refund.RetCode != nil {
|
|
return "RetCode=" + strconv.Itoa(*refund.RetCode)
|
|
}
|
|
return "RefundStatus=" + refund.RefundStatus
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// markRefundFlowSuccess 尽力把订单关联的退款流水置为成功（best-effort，仅记日志不返回错误），
|
|
// 同时回写微信退款单号与推送原始报文（对账/审计用）。无本地流水（如 iOS 走 App Store 退款）时静默跳过。
|
|
func (s *OrderService) markRefundFlowSuccess(ctx context.Context, order *mysqlmodel.Order, wechatRefundNo, raw string) {
|
|
flow, ferr := s.refundDao.RefundFlowLogGetByOrderNo(ctx, order.OrderNo)
|
|
if ferr != nil {
|
|
if !isNotFound(ferr) {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: query refund flow failed", "order_no", order.OrderNo, "error", ferr)
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
updates := map[string]any{"status": RefundStatusSuccess, "success_time": nowUnix()}
|
|
if wechatRefundNo != "" {
|
|
updates["wechat_refund_no"] = wechatRefundNo
|
|
}
|
|
if raw != "" {
|
|
updates["callback_raw"] = truncateCallbackRaw(raw)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, uerr := s.refundDao.RefundFlowLogUpdateStatusByFrom(ctx, flow.RefundNo, flow.Status, updates); uerr != nil {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: sync refund flow success failed",
|
|
"order_no", order.OrderNo, "refund_no", flow.RefundNo, "error", uerr)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// markRefundFlowFailed 尽力把订单关联的退款流水置为失败并记录微信失败原因（best-effort），无本地流水时跳过。
|
|
func (s *OrderService) markRefundFlowFailed(ctx context.Context, order *mysqlmodel.Order, refund *wechat.XPayRefundNotify, raw string) {
|
|
flow, ferr := s.refundDao.RefundFlowLogGetByOrderNo(ctx, order.OrderNo)
|
|
if ferr != nil {
|
|
if !isNotFound(ferr) {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: query refund flow failed", "order_no", order.OrderNo, "error", ferr)
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if flow.Status == RefundStatusSuccess {
|
|
return // 已成功，不用失败态覆盖。
|
|
}
|
|
failReason := "虚拟支付退款失败:" + refundRetCodeText(refund)
|
|
if refund.RetMsg != "" {
|
|
failReason += "-" + refund.RetMsg
|
|
}
|
|
updates := map[string]any{"status": RefundStatusFailed, "fail_reason": failReason}
|
|
if refund.WxRefundID != "" {
|
|
updates["wechat_refund_no"] = refund.WxRefundID
|
|
}
|
|
if raw != "" {
|
|
updates["callback_raw"] = truncateCallbackRaw(raw)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, uerr := s.refundDao.RefundFlowLogUpdateStatusByFrom(ctx, flow.RefundNo, flow.Status, updates); uerr != nil {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay refund: mark refund flow failed",
|
|
"order_no", order.OrderNo, "refund_no", flow.RefundNo, "error", uerr)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// truncateCallbackRaw 截断回调原始报文，避免超长报文写入退款流水（按 rune 安全截断，防止产生非法 UTF-8）。
|
|
func truncateCallbackRaw(raw string) string {
|
|
const maxCallbackRawLen = 4096
|
|
if len(raw) <= maxCallbackRawLen {
|
|
return raw
|
|
}
|
|
cut := raw[:maxCallbackRawLen]
|
|
for len(cut) > 0 && !utf8.ValidString(cut) {
|
|
cut = cut[:len(cut)-1]
|
|
}
|
|
return cut
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleIOSRefundQuery 处理 iOS 退款问询（3 秒内应答，仅本地查询）。
|
|
// 按权益使用情况细化：权益已消耗则拒绝退款（result_code=1 + evidence），未消耗则建议退款；
|
|
// 建议退款后权益由后续退款推送 settleRefundSuccess 回收（回收链路保证「已消耗部分不回退」）。
|
|
func (s *OrderService) handleIOSRefundQuery(ctx context.Context, query *wechat.XPayIOSRefundQueryNotify) []byte {
|
|
order, err := s.orderDao.OrderGetByOrderNo(ctx, query.OutTradeNo)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if isNotFound(err) {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay ios refund query: order not found", "out_trade_no", query.OutTradeNo)
|
|
} else {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "xpay ios refund query: query order failed", "out_trade_no", query.OutTradeNo, "error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return wechat.BuildIOSRefundQueryResponse(1, "拒绝退款",
|
|
"订单号 "+query.OutTradeNo+" 在本地无记录，无法确认权益使用情况，拒绝退款")
|
|
}
|
|
// 已退款：款项已退回，再次建议退款会造成重复退款资损。
|
|
if order.OrderStatus == OrderStatusRefunded {
|
|
slog.InfoContext(ctx, "xpay ios refund query: reject, order already refunded", "order_no", order.OrderNo)
|
|
return wechat.BuildIOSRefundQueryResponse(1, "拒绝退款",
|
|
"订单 "+order.OrderNo+" 已处于已退款状态，不支持重复退款")
|
|
}
|
|
// 权益已消耗则拒绝退款，防止「已使用权益后白嫖退款」。
|
|
if s.iosRefundBenefitsConsumed(ctx, order) {
|
|
slog.InfoContext(ctx, "xpay ios refund query: reject, benefits consumed",
|
|
"order_no", order.OrderNo, "user_id", order.UserID)
|
|
return wechat.BuildIOSRefundQueryResponse(1, "拒绝退款",
|
|
"订单 "+order.OrderNo+" 发放的权益已被使用（上传额度已消耗或会员已生效），不支持退款")
|
|
}
|
|
slog.InfoContext(ctx, "xpay ios refund query: suggest refund, benefits unused",
|
|
"order_no", order.OrderNo, "user_id", order.UserID)
|
|
return wechat.BuildIOSRefundQueryResponse(0, "建议退款",
|
|
"订单 "+order.OrderNo+" 发放的权益尚未使用，建议退款")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// iosRefundBenefitsConsumed 判断订单发放的权益是否已被消耗（用于 iOS 退款问询拒绝策略）。
|
|
// 额度类：Cos 凭证已用 >0 视为已消耗；会员类：会员已生效（在有效期内）视为已使用。
|
|
func (s *OrderService) iosRefundBenefitsConsumed(ctx context.Context, order *mysqlmodel.Order) bool {
|
|
// 额度类：该订单发放的 Cos 凭证已消耗则视为已使用。
|
|
if order.CosQuota > 0 {
|
|
grants, err := mysqldao.NewQuotaGrantDao().QuotaGrantListByUserIDAndType(ctx, order.UserID, QuotaTypeCos)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
slog.WarnContext(ctx, "xpay ios refund query: list cos grants failed, treat as not consumed",
|
|
"order_no", order.OrderNo, "user_id", order.UserID, "error", err)
|
|
} else {
|
|
for _, g := range grants {
|
|
if g.RefID == order.OrderNo && g.Used > 0 {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// 会员类：会员已生效（vip_expire 在未来且非非会员），说明用户已开始享受会员权益。
|
|
if order.MemberDays > 0 {
|
|
if user, err := s.userDao.UserGetByID(ctx, order.UserID); err == nil {
|
|
if user.VIPExpire > nowUnix() && user.VIPType != VIPTypeNone {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
slog.WarnContext(ctx, "xpay ios refund query: get user failed, treat vip as not consumed",
|
|
"order_no", order.OrderNo, "user_id", order.UserID, "error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// finalizeVirtualPaidOrder 虚拟支付发货：记录支付信息、发放权益并发送通知。
|
|
// paidTime/transactionID 由调用方提供：推送路径取推送报文，查单补偿路径取 query_order 结果。
|
|
func (s *OrderService) finalizeVirtualPaidOrder(ctx context.Context, order *mysqlmodel.Order, paidTime int64, transactionID, raw string) {
|
|
if uerr := s.orderDao.OrderUpdateByOrderNo(ctx, order.OrderNo, map[string]any{
|
|
"pay_time": resolvePaidTime(paidTime),
|
|
"transaction_id": transactionID,
|
|
"callback_raw": raw,
|
|
}); uerr != nil {
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "finalize virtual paid order: update pay info failed", "order_no", order.OrderNo, "error", uerr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s.grantOrderBenefits(ctx, order)
|
|
|
|
sendNotification(ctx, order.UserID, 0, NotificationTypeOrder, "订单支付成功", "你购买的「"+order.GoodsName+"」已到账")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// resolvePaidTime 兜底支付时间：推送字段缺失/非法（<=0）时用当前时间，避免 pay_time 写入 0。
|
|
func resolvePaidTime(paidTime int64) int64 {
|
|
if paidTime <= 0 {
|
|
return nowUnix()
|
|
}
|
|
return paidTime
|
|
}
|